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Two cheers for Anglo-Saxon financial markets?
Institutional investors are good for industrial innovation, according to a study by CEP’s
director John Van Reenen and colleagues.
The increasing dominance of  pension f unds, mutual f unds and other institutional owners
in the US and UK stock markets has been a posit ive f orce f or industrial innovation and
growth over the past 30 years, according to a recent study that I have conducted with
Philippe Aghion of  Harvard and Luigi Z ingales of  Chicago.
Our research indicates that publicly traded companies in which institutional investors have raised their
equity stake will increase their innovation. These large companies have dispersed ownership so no
individual has much of  an incentive to keep an eye on the chief  executive of f icer (CEO).
We suggest that the posit ive role of  institutional investors is because of  their greater incentive and
ability to monitor companies’ perf ormance. They can of f er a kind of  job insurance to CEOs who are
prepared to take a chance on risky, but potentially rewarding, longer-term investments.
At a t ime when deregulated f inancial markets are under attack f rom many quarters, it rare to hear any
positive words f or some aspects of  the Anglo-Saxon f inancial model. Even bef ore the f inancial crisis, the
takeover of  the stock market by institutions – pension f unds, hedge f unds, mutual f unds and the like –
was condemned f or breeding a bias against long-term investments in innovation. Whereas Japanese and
German research and development (R&D) created better cars, it was said, Brit ish and Americans
specialised in producing better quick-f ix derivatives of  no long-term value.
Our study takes a contrary posit ion, arguing that the rise in institutional ownership – f rom under 10% in
the 1950s to over 60% today – has actually been a posit ive f orce f or innovation and growth. We look at
publicly traded US corporations that were responsible f or the bulk of  private sector R&D over the past
40 years and track what happens when institutions increase their equity share.
Analysing data on the accounts and patenting activity of  803 publicly traded US f irms f rom the mid-1970s
to the early 2000s, we f ind that a greater role f or institutional investors is f ollowed by a burst of
innovation in f uture years as indicated by patents (weighted by citations to ref lect their importance), R&D
and productivity.
This does not seem to be because institutions are better at predicting f uture breakthroughs, as the
burst of  innovation occurs even af ter events that increase institutional investors’ role, such as policy
changes f avouring investor activism and gaining membership of  the S&P 500 index of  the US stock
market (which boosts institutional ownership).
We argue that institutions have a greater incentive to monitor top managers than individual owners as
they typically have larger blocks of  company shares. They also have a better ability to monitor managers
as they own shares in many companies and know how to set up better systems f or keeping an eye on
CEOs.
Monitoring might improve incentives f or innovation because lazy managers are f orced to put in more
ef f ort rather than lazing around on the golf  course or the ski slopes of  Davos. This would imply that the
impact of  institutional investors is stronger when managers are more entrenched due to weak
competit ion or protection f rom takeovers.
In f act, we f ind that the role of  institutions is greater when managers are less entrenched, so we pref er
an explanation based on ‘career concerns’. Innovation is a risky business, so top managers f ear that
they will be f ired if  they take a chance by investing in innovation and things turn out badly through no
f ault of  their own. By gathering more inf ormation on managerial quality, institutions of f er some insurance
to CEOs who are prepared to take a chance on risky, but rewarding, investments.
One test of  our career concerns theory is to look at CEO f iring. Poor prof itability perf ormance is of ten
f ollowed with the abrupt booting out of  the incumbent CEO. But our research shows that decreases in
prof it – which may not be the sole f ault of  the CEO – are less likely to cause a f iring when institutional
investors are stronger. This is in line with the view that institutions give some insurance protection to
managers and encourage them to take on more risky innovation.
Since innovation is the engine of  growth, the institutional ownership that characterises the Anglo-
American f inancial system clearly has long-run benef its. These benef its should not be regulated away in
the current backlash.
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